A Comparison And Contrast Between Flowers From Another World Ad Hi, Ar :: essays research papers

ENGLISH COMPARATIVE ESSAY ASSINGMENT II ‘A comparison and contrast between â€Å"Flowers from another world† and â€Å"Hi, are you alone?†Ã¢â‚¬â„¢ This essay will attempt to compare and contrast two films directed by Spanish director actress Iciar Bollain. The films to be compared and contrasted are â€Å"Hi, are you alone? (â€Å"Hola,estas sola?†) and â€Å"Flowers from another world† (â€Å"Flores de otro mundo†). The most apparent reason for comparing and contrasting these two films is that both focus their attention on women’s affairs and behaviours in today’s Spanish society, both display similarities in their content but most important is the differences that one may find in the portrayal of women the director seems to be interested in. A) â€Å"Hi, are you alone?†: Trini and La Nià ±a are the same age: 20, and have the same uncomplicated way of going about things, they simply go ahead and do them. The two girls also share the lack of a mother. During their trip, they share everything, including Olaf, a Russian who knows not a word of Spanish and with whom La Nià ±a has an affair. They have a mutual letdown: Marilo. La Nià ±a finds love and loses it, finds her mother to lose her again, but also finds a friend, Trini, whom she is certainly not about to lose. This is film is regarded by many critics as an enchanting road movie about being a woman, being young, love and frienship is the first directorial work by Iciar Bollain. In this opera prima, Iciar shows her ability to direct actors, especially her two leading actresses, but it is in her handling of a story told so many times before (two girlfriends on the road has been the theme everywhere, who can forget Thelma and Louise!) and thus making look so fresh and original that her directorial t alent is revealed. She has managed to capture, not the loss of innocence, but the gaining of maturity, the moment when we learn which things we can change and which we cannot. In this film we do not find a false step since the fraternal relationship between the two young women is very cleverly constructed and transmitted to the audience. We also feel that the two leading actresses, Silke and Candela Pena are up to the level of the rest of the film. B) â€Å"Flowers from another world†: A bus load of women arrive at a bachelor ceremony in a dying Spanish village in hopes of marrying men that can support them and in some cases, their children.

Lord of the Flies: Human Nature :: Character Analysis

I believe that human nature shows what type of person we are. Human nature guides us as individuals to do the right thing. We learn by our surroundings and it plays on our society and the nature of us as humans. This question had me ponder the question whether or not humans can be born evil? The book just made me think of all the times I have grown up and seen some bad incidents that are part of life. Someone close to me has made an abundance of bad choices in his life and when I was younger, he was the one I always looked up to as a â€Å"brotherly figure† but also as a best friend. He was the one that saved my life when I was younger. He was also somebody that I could trust with my life, but then I ask myself how he became such a bad person because he started hanging with the wrong crowd. He ended up pushing me aside to be with his so-called friends at the time. I think his true nature was starting to show through. He was not the brotherly figure I used to know when I was just a child; he had changed from a brotherly figure I used to know and have so much admiration for, but now he is someone that I do not like being around. I wonder if environmental surroundings had shaped both him and me, and to what extent this influence had on the both of us. He and I had changed very much since we were both children, now he is getting ready to turn 25 and I am 19. I believe our human nature makes us the type of people we are today. In Lord of the Flies, I realized no matter how good of person you are your true nature always comes through. For example, in the story you see how evil Roger can be while on the other side you see how good Ralph is. I think that is where I saw the symbolism between all the characters and each character has their own characteristics from our true human nature. I have seen that each character in the story had their shown their true nature. Roger’s character in the story is someone that has a true nature of being evil, but if you look at Simon’s point of view, you would see how he represented the good side of human nature.

The Dead Towns Of Kola

Gently stepping upon the gravel of the old roads, the old wind roared from the sea, bringing punishing gusts of fine sand and gravel from the beaches far away. Grass lands surround what was a thriving town full of life, now dead with not a soul around, the land reclaimed by nature, and scared by the permanent skeletons of ancient buildings without a purpose. The old base is still there, with high walls and concrete bunkers laughing menacingly in the face of nature, its large guns frozen in rust, still facing out to sea, waiting to defend against those who never arrived in the ever relentless, raging wind. A shadow moves rapidly in the distance, a small hare speeding through the grass, poking its nose up and sniffing the air, checking the salty breeze for dangers. Startled by a small bird over head, it darts off running against the furious winds, past the old buildings, along the deserted streets. The signs of the old shops glare down onto the street their windows ravaged by cracks and diseased by time, standing in linear patterns like a gallery of despair, long tender branches thudding against them in the ever relentless, raging wind. Gently floating down, a fleck of paint lands on the table inside the abandoned farm house, this large structure once home to the generations of family who lived here, now occupied by the generations of animals left behind. Another gust blows in violently and viciously shaking the antique structure, forcing dust from the beams in the roof, a single shingle stolen from the roof by the ever relentless, raging wind. Walking towards the naval bases of the beach, the sights amaze, the bodies of ships scattered upon the sands, steadily dying in the dismantling salt waves. The boats of the industry left to rot amongst the rocks and the ever relentless, raging wind. Viciously rattling the chains on the gates the wind stops for a while, just enough time for the loud crash of a fishing crane to fall from its boat and fill the air with its resonating boom, this is quickly replaced with the sounds of the ever relentless, raging wind. The great white sands on the beach contrast with the blood red grass of the dunes, their usual green blades poisoned by the red rust of the dying ships in the bay. A small pair of pointed ears pops up protruding from the poisoned plants. The hare has come back this time grazing upon the rust red plants away from the tiny town and the ever relentless, raging wind. Standing tall with the harsh grey fortress, a single flag still flies amongst the torn shreds of others, its blood red colours standing battered from its 20 years of isolation, guarding over its fortress with its single red star, its hammer, its sickle, honouring the united nation that forgot it, still bearing its insignia. Further into the base through the fallen chain gates lies a grounded submarine, half sunken into the asphalt ground, a memorial to those lost in a war forgotten, reclaimed by natures penetrating grass, and tree's blowing with the ancient flag, in the ever relentless raging wind.

Level 3 Diploma Perioperative Support Essay

Explain how and why person centred values must influence all aspects of health and social care work Some of the person centred values that influence aspects of health and social care are; Good communication How By using good communication you can give a person centred approach to care. Giving a patient/individual as information as possible is a way of good communication, inform them what you are doing before you do it and while you are doing it, explain why you will be doing what you are doing or about to do and let them know what to expect i. . if you are about to canulate them let them know that they may feel a sharp scratch Why Giving a patient/individual constant information helps make the patient feel at ease as they feel more involved in what is going on and have a clear understanding of what is going on , this also gives the individual the knowledge of what will be happening and why. Communication is a key element in giving person centred care Choice How By asking a patient/individual if they would like to keep there hearing aid in while I take the patient down to theatre I am giving them a choice whether they would like to remove there hearing aid or choose to keep it on. Why By giving patients/individuals choices you are giving them a bit of control in an environment where patients can feel they have no control over what is happening and by giving them small options it can make them feel a bit more in control and give them some dignity and respect. Making time How In main theatres it can be hard to make time for patients as time is usually of the essence and the need for keeping the theatre list moving quickly and efficiently is paramount, but by simply talking to your patient while you are transporting them down to theatre can make all the difference, it helps calm the patient down, taking there mind off the operation they are about to have. By talking to them while you are transporting them you are still keeping to the time limits set out before you. Why Making time for a patient/individual is probably the most important thing you can do in a system where the patient may feel like there being dragged from pillar to post in a busy department where no one has time for them and feel that it’s a case of â€Å"get them in get them out† attitude. Taking just two minutes out of your schedule can make a massive difference to a patient as it helps reassure them that they are not forgotten which makes the patient feel important and not a burden on the system.

American Military history Essay

American Military history is filled with examples of complex operations executed with varying degrees of success. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The most complicated of these missions typically involve multi-phase implementation. The success of multi-phased missions is typically contingent on the actions of multiple agencies, which as a matter of course must interact throughout the duration of the mission. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Historically, the nature of the interaction between various agencies with vested interest in the success of given operations has been varied. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The overall success of such operations is contingent upon many factors, not the least of which is a high level of cooperation between agencies. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The reasons for operational failures in complex missions are many and varied, but the lack of cooperation between agencies is one reason that is inexcusable and preventable through proper training. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Background: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission of 1980 is one of numerous examples of American attempts to rescue hostages that ended in complete or partial failure. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Up to that point, the record of American military and paramilitary forces in executing successful missions against relatively soft targets had been poor. A facile explanation of this trend would be a lack of proper training and poor execution by the soldiers, sailors and airmen on the ground, but the facts do not support this hypothesis. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) In all cases, the failures of hostage rescue missions lay in the planning and command-chain difficulties that compromised the discretion of the assets on the ground. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Task Force Baum in 1945 was a POW rescue mission commanded by General George S. Patton. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Their mission was to rescue 200-300 POW’s being held by the Germans behind enemy lines. As a result of poor intelligence, the Task force encountered no fewer than 1500 POWs, whom they rescued. The larger number of rescuees compromised Task Force Baum’s exit strategy. As a result, all the POWs and nearly 300 of the rescuers were killed. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The failure in this case was not on the ground, but with faulty intelligence, a problem that would become thematic in accounts of mission failures as time went on. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Another example of bad intelligence compromising a mission took place in 1970. A rescue team led by Col. Bull Simmons and consisting of fifty-six Special Forces units was dispatched into north Vietnam for the purpose of liberating a POW camp at Son Tay. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The assault force ended up attacking a camp that had been emptied of prisoners for at least one month. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) In yet another example of intelligence failure, the U. S. Marines attempted to rescue the crew of a captured cargo ship in 1975. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The opposing force in this case was the Cambodians, and the operation centered on Koh Tang Island, where the hostages were thought to be held. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) After a coordinated assault on the island cost nearly seventy casualties (eighteen dead or missing), it was discovered that the hostages had already been released and were, at the time of the assault, returning to their own ship on a Thai fishing boat. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) This poor track record of agency conduct of intelligence continued in 1980, when a joint multi-service force attempted to rescue fifty three Americans who were being held hostage in the embassy in the capital of Iran. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) A close examination of this mission yields insights into failures that resulted from inter-agency and inter-service communications breakdowns, intelligence problems, and command issues. From the planning stage on, this mission suffered from the lack of interagency cooperation. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Analysis: In the planning stage of any operation, it is vital that a number of elements be present. (Schnaubelt, 2005) The plan must articulate the organizational objective, accurately describe the current strategic and tactical situation, set forth the intended flow of events, and a definition of the expected contribution of all individuals and groups involved. (Schnaubelt, 2005) In order to have the maximum odds of success, such a plan must contain a clear indication of chain of command, robust and accurate intelligence, and sufficient secrecy to ensure the integrity of the mission. (Schnaubelt, 2005) The Iran Hostage Rescue attempt failed on many of these criteria. Of particular issue was the chain of command. (Sick, 1987) During the execution of the task, pilots in the operation later told investigators that they had no clear understanding of who had authority to be issuing orders. (Sick, 1987) This determination is an element that should have been made abundantly clear to participating personnel well before the execution phase of the operation. (Sick, 1987) In another critical example of failure of the articulation of the chain of command, the Task Force commander and his inferior officers were unclear on who held the responsibility for mission training of the helicopter crews. This state of affairs was allowed to persist for months before the execution phase of the operation. (Sick, 1987) The result of this confusion was a situation that resulted in a collision of helicopters during the aborted mission, which cost several lives. (Sick, 1987) These failure pale in comparison with relation to scope compared to the issues of intelligence that were brought about by multi-agency participation in information control. The numerous intelligence liaisons were encumbered by a specific and inflexible OPSEC (operational security) protocol, which hampered attempts to make information known to the necessary portions of the task force. (Halloway, 1980) This resulted in an unnecessary delay in intelligence compilation and analysis. It is important to note that this deficiency does not point to a shortcoming in intelligence gathering mechanisms, but rather in the inter-agency handling of gathered intelligence. (Halloway, 1980) The resulting delays in formulating intelligence estimates could have been avoided with a centralized intelligence conduit within the task force to which all relevant agencies would be required to contribute. (Halloway, 1980) This failure was justified by the decision-makers in the name of operational security, yet the fragmented gathering of relevant data made the intelligence much more vulnerable to compromise than would have been the case with a centralized intelligence mechanism. (Halloway, 1980) In the preparation phase of the Iran Task Force Operation, failures again occurred predicated on multiple agencies withholding cooperation on the basis of OPSEC issues. (Halloway, 1980) The result was a lack of a full-scale rehearsal for the operation, an element vital to anticipating contingencies, training personnel and refining operational plans. Across the board, there seemed to be more of an interest in rapid execution than in sufficient preparation. (Halloway, 1980) It is clear that a number of involved agencies would have had an issue with lack of preparation, but their objections were not given sufficient attention as the organizational decisions were out of their hands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned an analysis of the Task force operation (called Operation Eagleclaw) that was completed and presented to the Department of Defense in 1980. The analysis indicated twenty-three issues that contributed to the mission failure, and in many cases, lack of inter-agency organization and coordination were at the heart of the issues. (Halloway, 1980) The first issue addressed in the analysis was that of OPSEC. Since this was acknowledged to be a mission-critical priority, it was this element that was stressed the most during planning and preparation. (Halloway, 1980) The lack of inter-agency communication was said to have negatively effected the planning of and preparation for the operation. It was concluded that the OPSEC plan ought to have had more flexibility at least within the Joint Task Force. (Halloway, 1980) A clear delineation of who was â€Å"in† and who was â€Å"out† that transcended agency affiliation would have been a far more effective method of OPSEC, but interagency mistrust of the integrity of various agencies compelled coordinators to adopt inflexible OPSEC protocols. (Halloway, 1980) Despite the conclusion that OPSEC of the mission was adequate, it is clear that other issues could have been resolved in the preparation phase with better cooperation with regard to OPSEC. A second issue addressed in this mission was the fact that the planning did not include all necessary agencies at all stages. (Halloway, 1980) The planning team began with a limited number, and was expanded as the contingency became more of a definite probability. The haphazard organization of the Joint Task Force created gaps in planning and contingency that might have (but did not, in this case) compromised the success of this mission. (Halloway, 1980) In the absence of a standing task force consisting of multi-agency input, the necessary agencies should have been determined in advanced and all agencies should have been privy to all elements of planning. Again, the justification for the â€Å"need-to-know† contribution to the plan was OPSEC. (Halloway, 1980) The report also noted that intelligence coordination for the mission was executed in the same ad hoc manner, and reporting mechanisms were inconsistent, as task force command got direct reports from some agencies while others reported to component commanders. (Halloway, 1980) As cohesive, accurate and timely intelligence is vital to mission success, this qualified as a major concern in the execution of Eagleclaw. (Halloway, 1980) The fact that intelligence failure did not play a role in the ultimate failure of Eagleclaw should not be construed as an endorsement of the interagency disorganization inherent in early intelligence coordination efforts. (Halloway, 1980) The fact that as planning progressed, the intelligence conduits gained efficiency is also ancillary to the critique of the earlier efforts. (Halloway, 1980) The next major issue identified in the operation was the lack of independent overview of the plan-in-chief. (Halloway, 1980) While reviewed at several phases by the Joint Chiefs, Eagleclaw was never subjected to the robust evaluation by an independent panel of qualified experts. Once again, the blame for this oversight could be laid at the feet of OPSEC. (Halloway, 1980) This deficiency may have been mission-critical, because had such an independent review board contained an expert on local climate conditions and their effect on operational equipment, he or she might have informed the Task Force leadership about the necessity of specialty equipment, repair and spare parts that could have prevented the reduction in force from eight to five helicopters, which fact resulted in the abortion of the mission. (Halloway, 1980) Perhaps the most important deficiency of the Joint Task Force efforts was the lack of comprehensive, multi-agency rehearsal of all elements of the plan. (Halloway, 1980) The execution of such rehearsal is of vital importance at all levels of the operation. At the personnel level, rehearsal gives the actors a sense of the mission circumstances in a safe manner that reflects real-time environment. (Halloway, 1980) The rehearsal is equally beneficial to planning personnel in that a run-through can highlight unforeseen practical or logistical problems in the plan, which can be corrected in subsequent planning. Again, the specter of OPSEC, along with the logistical difficulties of planning a rehearsal of a joint exercise prevented the execution of this vital step. (Halloway, 1980) An issue that also undermined the success of the mission was the constant change in the political circumstances of the hostage situation during the planning phase of the operation created a constant flow of changes in the composition and organization of the task force, which, in turn, created confusion within the command structure regarding chain of command. (Halloway, 1980) Ultimately, the operatives went into mission without a clear sense (in the case of the pilots) of the authority of those giving orders to be giving those orders. While this circumstance did not prove to be a vital flaw in this particular mission, it is a flaw that could easily resulted in a disastrous mission marred by conflicting orders, causing confusion, and, very likely, casualties and mission failure. (Halloway, 1980) The implementation of Signal Integrity contingencies was another area of major failure within the Joint Task Force. While all the agencies involved has a robust understanding and solid implementation of signal protocol during the mission, the agencies did not coordinate these protocols. (Halloway, 1980) As a result, assets entered the area without a uniform protocol with respect to signals integrity. In the case of the helicopter pilots, the maintenance of strict radio silence prevented them from getting vital updates on the weather conditions in the area, leading to some of the mechanical issues that contributed significantly to mission failure. (Halloway, 1980) It is likely that the agencies with the best understanding of the importance of the weather would have implemented an signal integrity protocol that allowed for frequent conditions updates without the need for requests from the pilots, but such a plan was not implemented because it would have combined signal integrity protocols from multiple agencies. (Halloway, 1980) The origin of the circumstances that led to the abortion of the mission was the lack of helicopters necessary to complete the task in the face of mechanical failure of three of the helicopter units. (Halloway, 1980) An independent review of the equipment parameters would likely have called for at least ten helicopters to account for the possibility of mechanical failures. Such a provision would have prevented the abortion of the mission, which was precipitated by the disabling of three of the available helicopters. (Halloway, 1980) Again, proper review and oversight of the mission by independent auditors would likely have recommended ten helicopters be mission-ready at the time of the launch of the operation. These assets were readily available and could easily been incorporated into the Joint Task Force’s equipment requirements without compromising other endeavors. (Halloway, 1980) The mission training protocol for the helicopter pilots also presented problems that were in part caused by the interagency coordination of efforts. (Halloway, 1980) The Navy pilots tasked to drive the helicopters lacked operational experience in the conditions for which the mission called. The Joint Task Force Command addressed this deficiency by supplementing the number of pilots with those from the Marine Corps who had more experience flying in the expected conditions. (Halloway, 1980) Problems developed as pilots were rotated in and out of the training protocols on the basis of ability. In addition, the need to be mission-ready on short notice necessitated several two-three week sessions for training, rather than a preferred five-month long continuous program. (Halloway, 1980) The end result was a group of flying personnel who were not optimally trained, and did not have the necessary experience to deal with conditions in which they found themselves. (Halloway, 1980) The deficiency here mainly lies in the exclusion of Air Force pilots from the docket of potential pilots. It had been established after the fact that the Air Force had several pilots with operational experience in rescue missions, mid-air refueling, and other elements of the flight portion of the mission. (Halloway, 1980) It stands to reason that these pilots would have been likely to accomplish the mission training in a faster, more efficient manner than pilots without this background. When the mission commanders elected to use RH-53D helicopters for this mission, they were institutionally bound to use the pilots checked out on these machines, even though their flight experience did not match the particular mission parameters. (Halloway, 1980) Obviously, the primary factor in the operational failure of the mission was the unexpected dust storms encountered by the pilots en route to the mission. As previously noted, communication liaisons with local weather reporting services may have compromised the security of the operation, however, in retrospect, it seems that such a risk was worth the potential problem given two factors. First, this communication would necessarily be short-term, as any other weather information would be unreliable. (Halloway, 1980) This would relieve security concerns because even if the mission parameters were compromised at that point (and there is no particular reason to assume it would have been) the opposing force would not have sufficient time between the breach of security and the execution of the mission to mount sufficient contingency plans. Second, the ability to successfully navigate to the target area was a critical element in the mission, and a â€Å"sine que non† requisite of success. (Halloway, 1980) Again, in retrospect, it would appear that marginal security concerns outweighed common sense in making the determination to fly without up-to-the minute weather condition updates. Another related option rejected by the Joint Task Force was the use of C-130s in a pathfinder role. (Halloway, 1980) The employment of such equipment in such a manner would have gone further to guarantee rendezvous times and protocols despite adverse weather conditions. Crew of the mission copters lacked confidence in the navigation equipment and their own ability to use it. (Halloway, 1980) This sort of arrangement is the type of non-typical application that would raise alarms between agencies, some of whom would deem off-book applications of material as an unnecessary risk for their own assets. (Halloway, 1980) The decision of the pilot of helicopter #5 to abort mission given the particular damage to his vehicle reflected a lack of knowledge of the capabilities of the vehicle in question. Given the nature of the damage as indicated by on-board diagnostic equipment, the craft would have been able to continue at minimal risk for several hours given the speed and other operation conditions. (Halloway, 1980) The pilot’s decision to abort mission on the basis of this particular damage reflected both a lack of understanding of the nature of the damage, and a gross underestimation of the criticality of the vehicle’s participation. (Halloway, 1980) It was Helicopter #5’s decision to abort that triggered a mission-wide abort, as the number of operable craft had dropped below that which was determined to be mission-critical. (Halloway, 1980) The pilot’s possibly mistaken decision to abort was a function of his lack of training on the vehicle, and understanding of the criticality of his component of the mission. (Halloway, 1980) The fault for these deficiencies lay not with the pilot, but with the afore-mentioned training deficiencies, and a lack of mission-brief emphasis on the lack of discretionary aircraft available to the mission. Lack of information control in the area of intelligence resulted in the pilots acting upon inaccurate intelligence with respect to the capability of the opposing forces’ radar. After the fact, it became apparent that a number of pilots relied on inaccurate intelligence regarding this factor in making tactical determinations regarding flight altitude. The use of the bad information resulted in high-risk, unnecessary flight protocols. (Halloway, 1980) Despite the lack of immediate functional consequence resulting from this breach, it bears mentioning that intelligence need always be reported to the appropriate agencies for confirmation or denial before being acted upon. (Halloway, 1980) The culture within the Joint Task Force regarding intelligence flow encouraged the informal passing of vital intelligence. A lack of an interagency focal point of intelligence analysis made the confirmation and even identification of raw data difficult. It remains a possibility that the pilots placed an inordinate amount of trust in intelligence, believing it to have been confirmed by the responsibly agents, when in fact it had not. (Halloway, 1980) Such considerations are beyond the scope of responsibly of assets in action or support of action. These assets have to be able to assume that any intelligence that makes it way to them is either accurate, or that they have been informed of the probability of inaccuracy, and counseled as to the weight the information should receive in the operations. (Halloway, 1980) When the helicopters began to stray from mission parameters in location and timetable, the radio silence protocol prevented each unit from having vital information about the conditions and locations of other units in the operation. (Halloway, 1980) The USS Nimitz had the capability of conveying such information with minimal risk to OPSEC. Again, the rigidity of OPSEC protocols, brought about by inflexibly inter-agency protocols led to a critical information gap at a vital time in the mission. (Halloway, 1980) Thus, the lead helicopter had no way of knowing that #8 had recovered the crew of #6 and that #6 had been abandoned in the desert. (Halloway, 1980) Lead also could not determine whether the other elements followed him when he turned back in the dust storm, and where and when the unit had fallen apart. Most significantly, if Helicopter #5 had known that his termination would cause an entire mission abort, he might have more carefully weighed the risks of continuing. Essentially, between the weather and the radio silence, the pilots were flying blind and deaf in enemy territory. (Halloway, 1980) Yet another factor at issue was the decision to limit landing options to a single site near a road in the desert near the Iranian capital. The abandonment of the mission after the landing at Desert One guaranteed OPSEC compromise. (Halloway, 1980) The addition of a secondary landing place for refueling and the on loading of combat personnel would have opened many alternatives for the flyers and other mission decision-makers in determining whether to abort, or accounting to course and destination changes prompted by weather contingencies. (Halloway, 1980) The culmination of these factors was the abortion of the rescue mission, which in turn led to a fatal accident as the pilots attempted to withdraw back to base. The operation was a strategic, tactical and political failure. Counterargument: The conclusion that the deficiencies noted above can solely be laid at the feet of the interagency coordination (or lack thereof) is facile and inaccurate. Indeed, even given the modern day organization of counter-terrorism mission task-forces, this mission was fraught with potential for failure. (Houghton, 2001) Operational security became the end-all consideration for the mission’s success, which determination caused many other factors creating risk to be finessed or ignored. Contingencies such as poor weather and mechanical failure cannot be laid at the feet of poor planning. (Houghton, 2001) The clarity of hindsight makes the deficiencies in operation EagleClaw obvious, but it takes a rather torturous analysis to reach the conclusion that the deficiencies can all be blamed on lack of inter-agency coordination. There are several factors that contributed to the failure of EagleClaw that had little to do with the planning and execution difficulties endemic of multi-agency involvement. (Houghton, 2001) First the fluidity of the political situation called for necessary plan adjustments throughout the preparation phase. Second, the unpredictability of weather played a significant role in the mission failure. Such a factor cannot reasonably be blamed on the planning or practice phases of the operation. Decisions that were based on OPSEC considerations were not necessarily a product of interagency confusion. (Houghton, 2001) While it is true that multiple OPSEC protocols were combined to create a stifling procedure on information, the need for secrecy in this mission was considered of paramount importance to its success. (Houghton, 2001) Conclusion: While several unrelated factors contributed to the failure of Operation EagleClaw, it is indisputable that the compartamentalization of information and the ineffective standardization of protocols contributed to the failure of the mission. (Taillion, 2001) Owing to a faulty intelligence analysis protocol, actors proceeded on faulty intelligence. Operation Security concerns ended up compromising reasonable safely contingencies as well. (Taillion, 2001) A determination of Operation Security parameters would have been much more easily concluded by an inter-agency organization that specializes in anti-terrorist operations and is willing to subordinate specific agency protocols for the sake of mission-specific parameters. (Taillion, 2001) The organization of assets in anti-terrorism operations have since been consolidated in agencies such as Homeland Security, yet operations continue to be hampered by reluctance to share assets, particularly intelligence, between agencies. It is recommended that the culture of competition between agencies be undermined by institutional policies that encourage cross-agency cooperation efforts. (Taillion, 2001) It is further recommended that operation planners for future endeavors be encourgaged to ignore inter-agency discrepancies in favor of protocols most able to facilitate the duccess of the missions.

Development and induction Essay

The origin of leadership training in the USA has its origin in the 19th century when the first university Programme was started. Since then academic community has played a vital role in the training of school principals. The development of the Standards was administered by the National Center for History in the Schools at the University of California, Los Angeles under the guidance of the National Council for History Standards with funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the U. S. Department of Education. (Brundrett2001). In UK national standards were introduced in 1994-1997 for head teachers to be prepared for their increased demand in their roles. The national standards for head teachers in UK were first introduced by the minister for education. The minister believed that head teachers needed preparation and support in their responsibility and training of head teachers should be a must according to the central government and not the local government. Further, the concern for education minister was for the head teachers to gain practical experience important to their responsibilities. The relevant practical skills were more familiar to leaders and managers in the commercial sector than education sector For head teachers to receive relevant experience on their job they required practical skills. In the USA university education enjoy support from the government, although it faced challenges from the leadership development. There are only two public schools in the world that have adapted standards for school principal. These are the USA Inter state school leadership licensure consortium (ISLLC) in 1996 and the teachers training agency (TTA) in England. The reason for this is that traditional has tended to view head teachers responsibilities as leaders rather than resource manager. (Brundret, 2007). In the early 21st century there was great interest of leadership in education due to the widespread belief that the quality of leadership makes a considerable impact to school and student end results. There is also increasing recognition that schools require effective leaders and managers if they are to provide the best education for their pupils. Effective leadership in schools require committed and trained teachers but also support from other senior and middle managers. Though, the need for quality leadership is widely accredited, there is a reduced amount of assurance about which leadership behaviours are most likely to produce favourable results at the end of the day. Therefore, educational leadership and management, use different leadership models to ensure, relative efficiency in developing successful schools. (Bush, 2005). There are various models that were used in leadership in both USA and UK. They include; instructional leadership that focuses on pupil learning, moral style involves merging leadership with democracy and particular care for the young. Participative leadership focuses on shared decision making among all the stake holders in education sector. Managerial style focuses on supervisory ‘cold’ achievements on targets while contingent leadership is where the leader adapts his or her particle style of leading. Of all these styles, transformational is the most comprehensive as it offers productive approaches leader. Leadership training programme have emerged recently in the international field. In 2000 the national college for school leadership was established to provide training for leadership development and research (DFES, 2004). Initiatives for improving school leadership has taken place in the USA and UK. Leadership development in relation to internationalizing and globalization has made the UK and USA governments to promote leadership development aiming at school improvement and also exchanging school leaders’ experiences. (Brundret, 2001). School heads need to provide and seek for effective organization and management of schools. These can be achieved through organizational structure which reflects the school principles and also implement plans and policies for the development of school facilities Head teachers have also the duty to manage the school as a whole; in that they are accountable to the school community. That is pupils benefit from a high quality education and everyone work together to accept responsibilities of the outcome. Schools exist in social contest therefore; head teachers must build a culture and a curriculum that takes into account the diversity of the school’s community. Also ensure that the pupils learning experiences are integrated with the community. He should partner with other sectors in providing for the academic, moral, social, spiritual and cultural for the well being of the school community. Induction ensures head teachers make improvements in their jobs and the school environment. An efficient induction programme helps school leaders and the staff to settle in without being taken aback by lack of support. Induction into the schools involves orientation, personal introductions, understanding the job responsibilities, knowing where to find things and understanding the values and polices of the school. Preparations should reflect the diverse needs such as full-time, part-time, temporary and prior experience, and the level of contact with children. Generally, induction programme will depend on individual circumstances. A well implemented induction programme had rewarding benefits to the school. They include; ? Effectiveness in their responsibilities. ? Encourage more effective and dependable relationships with pupils and help raise standards of behavioural and attainment ? Reduces misunderstandings and breaches of procedures and rules ? Leaders feel valued and supported as it’s concerned with high morale ? Problems in learning can be identified and addressed in advance ? Schools can demonstrate they have fulfilled their legal obligation to explain health and safety, safeguarding procedures and other Government legislation ? Supports staff retention; the cost of induction is insignificant compared with the cost of recruiting and training replacement staff. In England ,national standards for head teachers were developed by Teacher training agency (TTA) and introduced in 1997 because they perceived the tasks of school heads were changing, they come up with standards that focused on shaping the future, leading, learning and teaching, working with others, managing the organization and securing accountability(DFES,2004) There is no appropriate leadership but there are qualities that are desirable. According to the government’s teacher training agency the main requirement is the ability to give a clear direction and purpose, make decision and adapt to the new ideas which entails understanding and keeping to date with current education and communication among all staff levels. These abilities are important to the task of school leaders as they define the vision, mission and objective of the school. Achievement and quality of teaching depends on leadership development. NCSL emphasized that the national standards for head teachers even should be both encouraging and target a range of users, including governors. The advice should be inspirational in that the standards convey the excitement of this important role and encouraging so that serving head teachers continue to work in a way that improves and transforms schools and contributes to the future development of the education sector. Inter state School Leaders Licensure Consortium acknowledges leader who promotes the achievement of all students by providing the development, performance, and stewardship that is shared and supported by the school community. The leader has knowledge and understanding of: learning goals in a whole society, the principles of developing and implementing strategic plans, effective communication, effective consensus-building and negotiation skills . A leader who promotes the success of all students by ensuring management of the organization, operations, and resources for efficient and effective learning environment. The leader has knowledge and understanding of: theories and models of organizations and the principles of organizational development and legal issues impacting school activities. Leadership that promotes the success of all students by partnering with families and community members, responding to diverse community interests and needs, and mobilizing community resources. The leader engages in activities ensuring that: high visibility, active participation and communication with the larger community is a priority and relationships with community leaders are identified. A school leader who promotes the integrity, fairness, and in an ethical manner. The leader believes in values and he is committed to: the ideal of the common good and the principles in the Bill of Rights (Bush, T. 2005) Well the quality of leadership is very important in school effectiveness. Participants receive input on aspects of leadership, opinion which they then use to examine their own work and that of their colleagues in the team. All fundamentals of this demanding programme are related to the needs of the particular team and will result in individual and team plans based upon necessary changes to improve performance. Even though different countries have significantly similar educational programme, for instance, the leader with strong emphasis in creating good practices including vision and mission. (Bush, 2005). Some countries have a programme for newly appointed school leaders like in England they have a budget to cater for head teachers personal professional development. This programme revolves around educational knowledge represented by research, participation in efficiency of schools and knowledge creation among the participants. Apart from school principals, deputy heads also undergo leadership development because some might seek school leadership roles. Another group of people that has to undergo leadership development programme are the middle managers, because they are mostly in classrooms. Some middle managers may be reserved about exercising leadership in what has been traditionally an idealistic profession and other members of staff may be unused to seeing them exercising this role. They then consider the impact they are making upon the various people they are responsible for leading and determine strategies for coping with the different demands by different people. Drawing from a survey carried out in North Carolina, training and learning increases experience and one must do the job to learn the job (Bush 2005) Leadership development requires action learning where individuals learn with and from each other and reflecting on their own experience. Mentoring is also important as the less experienced leaders learn from experienced this has been used in USA, Australia and England. Although, they make one to dependent on the mentor and time consuming leading to inefficiency in the long run. Coaching is also important in leadership development as it ensures commitment, good relationship, higher performance and good relationship. For school improvement leadership preparation is essential but as a result of globalization what worked well in a particular country might not be successful elsewhere. (Bush T 2005) National standards are useful as they ensures effectiveness in schools, pupils leave school when they are well fit, reduces mistakes, time management and the end result is quality service delivery. The value of standards also assumes quality leadership, consistency, good teaching practices, and the end product is pupil success. Consequently, standards reflect the mistaken idea for good leadership bringing about quality leadership but in reality it depends on the education values (orchard, 1994) Good leadership provides skill for the right strategies that lead to good performance in schools where practical skill among stakeholders are encouraged and responsibilities are shared. National Standards for head teachers were formulated following a meeting with teachers, head teachers, professional and subject associations, local authorities, higher education institutions and others from both inside and outside education. The Standards recognizes the main role that head teachers play in the development and delivery of government policy and in raising and maintaining levels of achievement in schools in order to meet the needs of every pupil. The National college school for leaders (NCSL) in UK has worked closely with school leaders in various schools to create a series of focus on how the national standards for head teachers have been put into framework by school leaders. The focus is anticipated to be a helpful resource for school leaders, offering ideas and possible ways to promote for schools trying to go with the National Standards with their individual framework. National standards for head teachers are applicable to school heads . They are intended to provide a context of professional development and action to serve aspiring head teachers. Therefore, standards have a range of uses. They assist in recruitment of school heads, provide guidelines to all stake holders as to what is expected from the head teacher and identify level of performance. Although, standards reflect wrong ideas about the quality of education. Different people have varying ideas about how to make education successful but in real sense for education to be worthwhile there must be formulated guidelines and good leadership in place. Also, standards can be educational idea rather than a value to quality leadership. (Orchard, 1994). Standards in schools do not portray the balance between professional qualities and leadership actions and it will be hard to measure goals and objectives. Standards have also portrayed a bad idea about experts in the educational sector; they assume that experts can judge educational achievement by the kind of leadership in place and also can take up positions from the experience they have from the industry. Standards also fail to differentiate responsibilities of good school leaders. In a democratic society justifiable leadership has to go hand in hand with productive decision making mechanisms. Use of standards is badly chosen at it assumes that all trained school leaders exercise good leadership. But standards cannot capture the all leadership qualities that are right or wrong for instance, in 2000 UK developed its national curriculum and all schools had to follow and you cannot suggest that its quality is right as all leaders in school have to be consistent with them. Therefore, this challenges standard because qualities and skills required for school leadership would be flexible to cater for individual school and pupil needs. Leadership at national level uses their efforts to improve education. Schools often function efficient where leaders serve the interest of the pupil are best served by less guidelines and therefore school leaders should be left to operate schools individually with limited set of rules. However, the key difference between the two counties is the continued existence and influence of the local education authorities in UK compared to USA where no existence of such, management of schools is influenced by the head teacher (DFES 2004) Unlike the National Curriculum in UK, their core subjects are: English, mathematics and science; USA follows a similar framework; however, schools can develop additional curriculum to meet individual pupils’ needs and circumstances. In UK school principal have the overall responsibilities and can be held accountable of any problem in schools unlike in the USA where the responsibilities are shared among all the stakeholders in the education industry (Orchard, 1994). Unlike in USA which provide leadership teams through its school leadership learning teams (SLLT) which involves ten sessions spread over two years, the national college school for leadership(NCSL) in UK has no such team and come up as a result of training head teachers from other members of their staff. Standards have dominated training and development of head teachers in UK and USA. Leading and managing schools is obligatory because these are public duties. Furthermore, from a professionally developed programme that reflect education on practical skills and qualities leaders are likely to be appreciated. Therefore, for them to be successful they should integrate academic programme, take account of their responsibilities and work together with the entire education industry. The development of more effective leadership for performance in schools should include; developing a customs where teachers and head teachers feel confident and empowered to participate fully in performance of school, the acknowledgement of professional responsibility to be involved in effective, sustained and relevant professional development throughout their careers and to contribute to the professional development of others, and the creation of an effective, sustained and relevant professional development as part of a wider review of teachers’ professional duties. For school effectiveness, improvement and providing culture within which teaching and learning will excel educational leadership has been viewed by many as an important element. Hence, training them has been of great importance especially, in UK where teachers aspiring to become head teachers, those newly appointed those head teachers who have been in post for some want to continue with their own professional development. The national standards for head teachers reflect education in schools. The main aim of head teacher is to provide professional leadership and management in schools through ensuring high quality teaching and learning opportunities for all pupils. For these to be viable the head teacher must have certain attributes like: knowledge and skills to actively participate in reflective learning to gain greater understanding his professional roles and management principle. Personal qualities and value are also important in a school leader; such qualities include commitment, integrity, consistency and confidence. Professional characteristics that clarify the diverse professional capabilities that help in understanding frameworks of accountability, promote social diversity and equal opportunities. (Brundret, 2001) REFERENCES Bush, T and Glover, D. (2005). `School leadership: concepts and evidence. London: Routledge. Brundrett, M. (2001). Development of school leadership preparation course in UK and America comparative analysis. Northampton: University of Leicester. Dfes, (2004) National standards for head teachers. London: Penguin. Hay, (2001). Management consultants. Leadership Programme for serving head teachers, London: Oxford University Press. Orchard, J. (1994), Are national standards for head teachers in England helpful? London: Institute of education

Clinical Health Psychology Assignment Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Clinical Health Psychology Assignment - Essay Example Limitations of the current research are discussed. The cognitive and emotional experience of cancer is associated with a broad range of reactions, from fear and anger to reconciliation and hope. Throughout the development of psychology science, cancer had always been one of the most problematic and challenging aspects of psychological strategies. Based on what the current research tells us, it is at least ridiculous to believe that psychologists can prevent cancer: they can either effectively alleviate the emotional and cognitive difficulties that necessarily emerge the moment the individual is being diagnosed with cancer, or contribute to the development of rational self-assessment and medical evaluation behaviors, which will help individuals, especially those with the genetic predisposition to cancer, to reduce the risks of being diagnosed with cancer when it is too late. The question of whether psychologists can prevent cancer is actually a question of whether psychology and individuals’ mental health are the basic predictors of cancer in various groups of patients. Postmodern medical science displays the tendency toward recognizing mental health conditions and complications as important contributors to other complex health states like asthma, diabetes, and even peptic ulcers (Nevid, 2008). Stress is cited among the most widely spread chronic health conditions that add their share of complexity to coronary heart disease and regular headaches (Nevid, 2008). For this reason, psychologists could provide individuals with effective support and reduce the risks of asthma and cardiovascular diseases associated with stress. Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to the question of whether cancer is the result of psychological influences. The extensive body of research proves psychology counseling to be an effective instrument of alleviating